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Past experiences have shown that the housing sector is subject to 
the influences of monetary policy. A study of the developments in 1965-
1968, however, raised some doubt as to the truth of this observation, 
Economic background and monetary policy were similar in the two years of 
1966 and 1968. Yet, the housing sector was seriously affected in one 
year and not in the other. This thesis is concerned with an analysis of 
the developments of this period and an attempt to find the reasons 
behind the differential performances of the housing sector in 1966 and 
1968, 
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Statement of the Problem 
Private housing is an important sector in the economy, In 1963, 
private residential construction expenditures were 4.5 per cent of the 
gross national product and 30 per cent of private domestic investment, 
Residential mortgage debt at the end of 1963 represented 20.9 per cent 
of the total debt, private and public, and 34.6 per cent of the private 
debt alone. 1 Variations in private housing construction, therefore, 
would be expected to have significant repercussions on the rest of the 
economy and would, therefore, be a cause for concern. 
A number of studies have shown that monetary policy is a signifi-
cant faftor affecting residential construction, 2 In periods of monetary 
1savings and Loan Fact Book, 1966, pp, 20 and 46. 
2see, for example, J.M. Guttentag, "The Short Cycles in Residen-
tial Construction/ American Economic Review, lI (J.une, 1961), pp. 275-
298; Sherman Maisel, "The Theory of Fl,uctuations in Residential Con-
struction Starts, 11 American Economic Review, LIII (June, 1963), pp. 359-
379; and Jerome Dasso, nTight Money and the Plight of the Homebuilding 
Industry," Oregon Business Review, XXV (October, 1966), pp. 1-4. 
1 
2 
ease~ the volume of housfog starts tends to rise, whereas in times of 
monetary restraint, it falls off, sometimes sharply. Situations in 
1953-54, 1955-57, and 1959-60 are good illustrations of this observation. 
Recent experiences of monetary restraint were in 1966 and 1968. 
Their differential impacts on the housing sector in these two years 
have aroused this writer's interest to undertake this study. A similar 
economic and monetary background existed in 1966 and 1968. Yet, resi-
dential construction was affected much more in one year than in the 
other. 
This study is concerned first with an analysis of the relationship 
between monetary policy and residential construction. It examines 
developments in the economy, in monetary policy, and in housing during 
the period 1965-1968 in an attempt to explain the differential perfor-
mances of housing in 1966 and 1968. 
Scope of the Study 
The second chapter of this study considers the characteristics of 
housing, It also discusses its financing, and the determinants bf 
residential construction in the short run. 
The third chapter is devoted to monetary concepts such as the mean-
ing of monetary policy, the common tools of monetary management, 
particularly Regulation Q, and the effects of monetary policy on housing. 
In Chapter IV, developments in the economy, in monetary policy, and 
in housing from 1965 to 1968 are traced. The purpose is to explain 
those developments during 1966 and 1968 which are the concern of this 
thesis .. The situations in these two years are then compared and 
analyzed, 




CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HOUSING SECTOR 
Introduction 
A knowledge of the characteristics of the housing sector is essen~ 
tial to an understanding of the ways in which monetary policy affect 
housing, The present chapter discusses some of these chairacteristics 
and the manner in which· housing is usually financed. It also considers 
the determinants of residential constructipn in the short run. Finally, 
an analytical approach to the determination of the volume of residen-
tial construction is also presented. 
Important Characteristics of Housing 
Certain characteristics make housing distinct from other goods. 
For one thing, housing is immobile, tied to particular plots of land 
in particular localities. This means surpluses in some localities 
cannot be transferred to meet scarcities in others. For one thing, 
housing is relatively expensive due to various costs involved in pro-
duction. It is, perhaps, the biggest investment expenditure in the 
4 
5 
lifetime of a household. According to a survey in 1962,3 for the popu-
lation as a whole, equity in owned homes accounted for 27 per cent of 
total wealth, a larger share of total wealth than any other asset. 
Among other things, this gives one an idea of the expensiveness of 
housing. 
Few households buy a house with cash, and most builders rely on 
borrowed funds to build houses. The result is that both consumers and 
producers of housing depend upon credit for their activities. This 
distinct feature of housing is explored in the following section. 
Residential Financing 
As early as the middle of the 1950 1s, a study by several econo-
mists already indicated an increased tendency to debt-financing in the 
housing sector. It also showed a rising ratio of net increases in res-
idential mortgage debt to housing construction expenditures. 4 In 1965~ 
a survey by the Federal Reserve showed that 95 per cent of new, one-
5 family homes sold involved mortgage credit to some degree. The rising 
trend of private nonfarm mortgage debt in the 1960 1s is indicated iin 
Figure 1. 
3oorothy Project9r and Gertrude Weiss, Survey of Financial Char-
acteristics of Consumers (Washington, 1966), p. 10. 
4Leo Greble'r, David Blank, and Louis Winnick, Capital Formation . ir!. 
Residential Real Estate (Princeton, 1956). 
5 ' Board of Governors of the Federa 1 Reserve System, "Monetary 
Po 1 icy and the Resi den ti a.l Mortgage Market ,U Federal Reserve Bul 1 etfo, 
LIII (May, 1967), p, 731. 
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If home-buyers are dependent on borrowed funds for their activi-
ties, home-builders are even more so, They are typically small, and 
their activities are local in nature. Few of them have the capital 
they need to engage in home-building. It is also generally believed in 
this industry that no one should ever build new homes for sale with any 
6 
of his own funds. If he cannot obtain long-term loans, he will borrow 
short. It is not unusual for home=builders to borrow on short-term 
loans, and repay them with the proceeds of the permanent mortgage when 
the house is sold. Thus, one of the peculiarities of the housing 
sector is that both consumers and producers of housing are dependent on 
outside financing. 
Construction and mortgage loans have traditionally been supplied 
by thrift institutions, the principal ones being savings and loan 
associations, mutual savings banks, and life insurance companies, 
These institutions, together with commercial banks, held more than 75 
per cent of the total mortgage debt of recent years. Of these four 
institutions, savings and loan associations are the largest suppliers 
of mortgage loans. They invest practically all of their available 
funds in mortgages, their lending authority being limited by law and 
regulation. Because their main source of funds comes from savings 
inflows of depositors who can withdraw their funds quickly, savings and 
6sherman Maisel, "The Relationship of Residential Financing and 
Expenditures on Res i den ti al Cons true ti on, 11 Conference _on Savi nts and 
Residential Financin.[, 1965 Proceedings, ed. Marshall KetchumChiicago, 
1965), p. 138. 
8 
loan associations have been labeled as "borrowing short and lending 
long,'' The other three financial intermediaries, namely, mutual savings 
banks, life insurance companies, and commercial banks, have more diver-
sified lending authority than savings and loan associations, and can 
allocate available funds among different types of investments on the 
basis of the rates of return, risks, and other considerations. During 
recent years, however, their shares of mortgage loans, excepting those 
of life insurance companies, have increased considerably. A breakdown 












PRIVATE NONFARM MORTGAGE DEBT HELD BY MAJOR INSTITUTIONS, 
IN PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION 
Savings Mutual Commercial Life Insurance 
and Loan .. Sav.ings Banks Companies 
39.2% 13 .0% 13.6% 17,,6% 
40.8 13. l 13 0 l 16.8 
41.9 13.3 13.3 15.9 
43.4 13.6 13.7 15.0 
44. 1 13.9 13.8 14,5 
44.2 14 0 l 14.3 14,0 
43.6 14.2 14. 7 13,6 
43.8 14,2 14,7 l2c7 
Source: Savings and Loan Fact Book, 1968, p. 37, 
9 
Determinants of Residential Construction 
A large number of factors has been mentioned by economists, at one 
time or another, as possible determinants of the volume of nonfarm 
residential construction. These factors may conveniently be grouped 
into nine categories, as follows: 7 
1, Changes in population, including changes in the number, type, 
and size of households and in the age-sex composition, 
2. Changes in income and employment. 
3. Consumer asset holdings and their distribution, especially 
liquid assets and equities in existing houses. 
4, Changes in the prices of housing, including the price of 
elasticity of housing relative to other prices and the shape of the 
construction supply and cost curves. 
5, Relationship between occupancy costs and prices of dwellings, 
inc·] uding credit availability and the cost of credit, 
6. Consumer tastes and preferences. 
7, Net replacement demand for dwelling units demolished or 
removed from the inventory, 
8, Conditions in the existing housing supply, including vacancy 
rates, prices, rents, qua·11ty and location of existiing units, 
7This list is based on the one given in Grebler and Maisel, 11 Deteirminants of Resiidential Construction: A Review of Present Know-
ledge,11 Commission Q!l M)ney and Credit, Itnpacts of Monetary Policy 
(Englewood Cliffs, 1963 , pp. 476-477. 
9,. Reaction to changes in demand - builders• and investorsu 
profit expectations and market structure and market information, 
10 
In considering the above factors, care must be taken to distinguish 
those which are more sfgnificant in determining long-run levels of 
housing construction from those which have an important bearing only on 
short-run changes. Since this study covers but a short period of time, 
only those factors which possibly cause short-run fluctuations in res-
idential construction are discussed, 
Of those factors mentioned above;, most economists seem to agree 
cost and availability of borrowing, income, prices of housing, con-
ditions 1n the existing supply, and builders' and investorsn profit 
expectations are main sources of variations in residential construction 
in the short run, These factors are discussed below: 
Cost and Availability of Borrowing 
This is perhaps the most important variable causing short-run 
changes in housing construction, William Newman (1935) found this to 
be true for the period before World War II, John lewis (1959)~ 
Leo Grebler (1951), Jack Guttentag (1960), Saul Klaman (1956), and 
Warren Smith (1958) reached similar conclusions regarding construction 
fluctuations during the period since World War II, Their general argu-
ment is this: cost and availability of funds to the housing sector 
have been greatly influenced by the level of general economic activity" 
When that level is high, the rising demand for funds by business and 
other sectors, some of which is less sensitive to increased cost of 
n 
borrowing,8 tends to reduce the availability of funds for housing, 
which is held to be very sensitive to changes in the cost of borrowing 
because this cost is an important part of the price of a house. When 
the level of economic activity drops, the supply of funds is ample 
relative to demand, and credit for housing becomes readily available. 
Income and Prices of Housing 
There seems to be no agreement among economists as to the impor-
tance of these two variables in short-run changes in residential con-
struction. Whereas Grebler, Guttentag, Klaman, and Smith (referred to 
above) all assigned an insignificant place to these factors, statis-
tical tests by J. M. Mattila, George Break, and others pointed to a 
positive and significant influence of income and prices of housing on 
construction. 9 The average income elasticity measured at the means was 
found to be between 2, 0 and 3, 0 for _.the period l 920-1958, meaning a one 
per cent increase in income was related to 2 to 3 per cent rise in 
.construction. Richard Muth found that the combined elasticity of con-
struction to income and price as high as 5.5. 10 
8A number of studies have shown that investmPnts are insensitive 
to interest rates, for example, F. A. Lutz, "The Interest Rate and 
Investment in a Dynamic Economy," American Economic Review, XXXV 
(December, 1954), pp. 811-830, and J. R. Meyer and Edwin Kuh, The 
Investment Decision (Harvard, 1957). 
9These statistical tests are discussed in Grebler and Maisel, p. 536. 
10Richard Muth, 11 The Demand for Nonfarm Housing,i• The Demand for 
Durable Goods, ed. Arnold Harberger (Chicago, 1960), p.---r6. -
12 
Housing and Profit Expectations 
Conditions .in the existing supply of housing and builders 1 and 
investors' profit expectations have been given important places in 
both long and short-run construction variations. The analysis runs as 
follows: The supply of housing units is relatively fixed in the short 
run, with annual new construction at around 3 per cent of the existing 
stock, When exogenous forces cause an increase in demand for housing, 
the vacancy rate drops. When this rate reaches some zone, rents and 
house prices are bid up. As prices continue to climb, exceeding con-
struction costs, expectation of profits by builders and investors also 
rise. New construction is encouraged. 
Empirical verification of this analysis has been given by 
Leo Grebler (1951), Ramsay Wood (1946), Chester Rapkin, Louis Winnick, 
and David Blank (1953). 
It seems safe to assume that changes in household formation and 
in population in general are unimportant in short-run construction 
fluctuations. Grebler, Guttentag, Klaman, and Smith (referred to pre-
viously) all assigned insignificant places to these variables in their 
studies. Apparently, changes in household formation and in population 
are usually too small in the short run to cause any significant fluc-
tuations in construction. 
The Volume of Residential Construction, 
An Analytical Approach 
The interaction of the demand for and the supply of housing deter-
mine the volume of housing construction in a given period of 
13 
time. 11 
On the demand side, it is assumed that all non-possessors of homes 
are possible home-buyers, and that they consider new and existing homes 
as close substitutes. On the supply side, two schedules exist. One 
represents the owners of existing homes, and the other, firms in the 
residential construction industry. Total supply is the sum of these 
two schedules. In Figure 2, the functions are assumed to be linear for 
the sake of simplicity. D represents the demand curve for housing. s2 
describes the relationship between price and quantity of homes offered 
by owners of the existing stock. 
Price 
It is assumed that at some price, the 
s, 
Quantity per 
Unit of Time 
Figure 2 - The Quantity of Homes Constructed During 
a Short Period of Time. 
11 This part is based essentially on Coldwell Daniel III, "The 
Volume of Nonfarm Residential Construction: An Analytical Framework," 
Land Economics, XXXVI {May, 1960), pp, 202-207. 
14 
owner of a dwelling becomes a seller. It is also assumed that s2 
becomes more inelastic as the limit of the existing stock is approached. 
s1 is .total supply. The difference between total supply and the supply 
of existing homes represents the quantity of new housing which will be 
offered by construction firms at each price. There exists some price, 
P0, which is sufficiently low that construction firms find it unprof-
itable to undertake any building activity at all. At price P1, total 
supply of housing is Q1, and total supply of existing homes is Q1, so 
that Q1-Q1 is the quantity of new homes constructed. 
Any time when any of the schedules shifts, the volume of residen-
tial construction will change. For example, in Figure 3, consider an 
increase in demand, resulting in a shift of the demand curve from Din 
the first period to D' in the second period. Consequently, the volume 
of residential construction increases from Q1-Q1 in the first period to 
Q2-Q2 in the s~cond, and price is bid up from P1 in the first period to 





, ; Quantity per 
, Unit of Time '--~~~-----....... --'-~...-~~~~-
Figure 3 - An Increase in Housing Construction. 
CHAPTER III 
MONETARY POLICY AND RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION, 
A THEORETICAL APPROACH 
Introduction 
Theoretically, monetary policy exercises its influence on housing 
through its effects on the cost and availability of borrowing to home-
buyers and builders. The present chapter spells out this theory. The 
first part is concerned with concepts relating to monetary policy, its 
meaning, and its tools of ma~agement, particularly Regulation Q. The 
second part of this chapter is devoted to the main theme -- effects of 
monetary policy on housing .. 
Monetary Policy Defined 
For the purpose of this study, monetary policy is taken to mean 
primarily actions of the Federal Reserve to regulate the tightness and 
easiness of credit conditions, and the behavior of the total supply of 
money (currency, bank deposits and other liquid instruments) for the 
purpose of achieving economic objectives. 
In the United States, the Federal Reserve System has four main 
objectives in mind whenever it decides to pursue a particular policy. 
15 
16 
Specifically, these objectives are the maintenance of full employment 
or nearly full employment, the maintenance of stable prices, the accel-
eration of economic growth, and the elimination of imbalances in inter-
national accounts. Whenever unfavorable conditions exist which hinder 
the achievement of any of these goals, the Federal Reserve would alter 
its policy in order to avoid disequilibrium in th.e economy. 
Policy Instruments of the Federal Reserve 
The chief weapon of the Federal Reserve in carrying out a policy 
is open-market purchases or sales of government securities. But inter-
mittently, other measures are also utilized. These include changes in 
the legal reserve requirement ratios against demand and time deposits, 
raising or lowering the discount rate at which banks can borrow from 
the Federal Reserve, moral suasion involving talks or letters to the 
banks regarding their lending activity, and Regulation Q governing max-
imum interest rates payable by commercial banks on savings and time 
deposits. Most of these instruments are quite well known. Not so 
widely discussed, but of importance to this study~ is Regulation Q. 
Regulation Q 
The Bank Act of 1933 established Regulation Q, giving the Federal 
Reserve the power to fix the maximum rate of interest member banks pay 
on time and savings deposits, The purpose was to remove from commer-
cial banks the use of deposit interest rates as a competitive device 
which was thought to have been a fundamental source of instab·ility in 
the banking system of the l920's. This authority of the Board to 
regulate maximum interest rates was exercised oITTly once !between 1936 
and 1961, and four times between 1961 and 1965. It is no wonder that 
so little has been known about this policy instrument. 
17 
Many of the implications of Regulation Q began to be realized 
after 1957 when changes in the maximum interest rates took place. It 
was found that savings and time deposit~ were quite responsive to 
interest rate differentials, and thus changes in the Regulation Q's 
interest rates would have a profound effect upon the volume of these 
deposits at commercial banks. As pointed out by Ritter in his study 9
12 
commercial bank time and savings deposits at the end of 1956 were only 
50 billion dollars or about 25 per cent of total depasitsD but in 19643 
some eight years after the raising of maximum rates, time and savings 
deposits had expanded by 150 per cent to 125 billion dollars or about 
45 per cent of total deposits. Whereas this increase could be attri-
buted to many factors, a good portion must have been due to the improved 
competitive position of commercial banks following a change in the 
interest rate ceilings. Statistical tests also supported the hypothesis 
that deposit growth is positively related to deposit rates at commercial 
banks. 13 
12Lawrence Ritter, Regulation Q: Issues and Alternatives (Chicago, 
1965) , p. 13. 
13see, for example, David Bond, 11 The Effects of a Change in the 
Ceiling Rates on Deposits at Commercial Banks, 11 ~ Economic ,gssa~, 
VII (Fall, 1967), pp. 139-194. 
Both savings and time deposits are quite interest-sensitive, A 
survey by the Federal Reserve on savings deposit changes following an 
increase in interest ceilings in 1962 found that those banks which 
18 
raised their interest rates to 4 per cent, the new maximum rate in 1962, 
averaged a 24 per cent rise in savings deposits during that year. Those 
who increased their interest rates to 3.5 per cent gained only 11 per 
cent in savings deposits. And those who did not change their interest 
rates at all had a growth rate of but 3 per cent. 14 A study of time 
deposit changes as a result of a rise in interest maximums also indi-
cated similar results. Until 1962, time deposits comprised about one-
fourth of total time and savings deposits. During the three years 
since the revision of maximum interest rates in 1962, time deposits 
expanded to constitute over one-third of total deposits. 15 
Savings deposits consist mainly of passbook savings of individuals 
and non-profit organizations. They are most competitive with deposits 
at mutual savings banks, shares of savings and loan associations, and 
credit union shares. Time deposits proper include time deposit open 
accounts, time certificates of deposits, and other special accounts. 
They represent short-term business and public funds seeking maximum 
yields. They are most competitive with short-term money market instru-
ments such as Treasury bills and commercial paper. Because of the 
14caroline H. Cagle, "Interest Rates on Time and Savings Deposits," 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, XLIX (June, 1963), pp. 766-772. 
15Lawrence Ritter,~- 13. 
19 
existence of these investments alternative to savings and time deposits 
at commerdal banks, any change in the Regulation Q1 s ceiling rates 
would cause individual and corporate wealth owners to shift their funds 
into or out of commercial banks, depending upon whether interest rates 
on commercial bank deposits are significantly above or below interest 
rates on competitive investments. Any changes in Requlation Q would 
cause wealth-owners to adjust their portfolios, and hence the volume of 
the flow of funds into various competitive instruments is also affectedo 
The probable impact upon wealth owners 1 portfolios of a change in 
interest rates paid on time and savings deposits at commercial banks 
has been elaborated by David Bond based on the theory of choice invol-
. · k 16 H · l · . f 11 A l th . h . v1ng r1s . 1s ana ys1s 1s as o ows; wea owner, given 1s 
attitude toward risk and income, selects from various possible invest-
ments that portfolio which maximizes utility. When the rate of return 
on one of the alternative assets increases, with the risk associated 
with the asset remaining the same, he will reconsider his portfolio. If 
the rise in the rate of return is large enough to overcome the cost of 
switching assets, he will readjust his portfolios, increasing the 
higher-yielding assets at the expense of other assets. Thuss for 
examples if interest rates on time and savings deposits rise, indi-
viduals would switch from holding assets such as thrift accounts, bonds, 
equities, and demand deposits to savings and time deposits. The future 
flow of savings will also be directed to these asset forms. Corporate 
16oavid Bond, pp. 139-194, 
20 
wealthowners would behave in a similar manner. They will increase the 
holding of time deposits if faced with the same situation described 
above, It has been shown that corporations tend to limit cash balances 
to amounts that maximize interest income and minimize transactions 
costs, 17 Therefore, if interest rates on time deposits rise, they would 
decrease cash holdings and other short-term assets in favor of time 
deposits and certificates of deposits. 
Regulation Q has become a powerful monetary tool of the Federal 
Reserve. Its revisions not only influence the volume of savings and 
time deposits at commercial banks, but the flow of funds into other 
market instruments would be affected as well, since increases in the 
flow of funds into one instrument are often at the expense of the others. 
As will be seen later in this study, changes in Regulation Q were at 
least partly responsible for a drastic decline in the volume of savings 
at savings and loan associations in 1966. 
Effects of Monetary Policy on Housing 
It was mentioned in Chapter II that cost and availability of bor-
rowing was an important determinant of residential construction in the 
short run, It is through these two variables that monetary po]icy 
exerts its infl.uences upon the housing sector. 
When the monetary authorities undertake a. restrictive policy or, 
21 
hi other words, when they tighten credit conditions and the money 
supply, through open-market sales of Government bonds, say, this action 
not only has a direct effect on the market price and y·ields of these 
bonds, it also has an effect on the market prices and yields of corpor-
ate bonds and other securities that are substitutes for Government 
bonds~ Such sales directly raise the interest rates on the issues sold 
and tend to raise the yields on Government securities of other maturi-
ties and the interest rates of corporate bonds, Since bonds are sub-
stitutes for investments in mortgage loans, the raising of bond yields 
tends to channel funds away from mortgages and to raise mortgage rates, 
During these periods of rising interest rates, the Federal Reserve 
tends to raise Regulation Q's ceiling rates, too; otherwise com.rnercial 
banks would be unable to compete with other market instruments for 
savings funds, It was for this reason that ceiling rates had been 
repeatedly raised in the l960's, 18 The raising of Regulation Q0 s 
ceilings would undoubtedly improve the competitive position of the com-
mercial banks but, as pointed out earlier in the chapter, it would also 
affect the competitive advantages that other market instruments have 
previously been enjoying, It could cause the weaHhowners to sMft 
their funds from one asset to another. 
Thrift institutions, particularly savings and loan associations, 
18Paul Samuelson, 11 Money, Interest Rates and Economic Activity: 
Thefr Interrelationship in a Market Economy. 11 Proceegings of·.~ S_xm-
posfom on _Money, Interest Rates and Economic Activit_y~ ed, The Amer-l-
can Bankers Associations (New York, 1967), p, 58. 
22 
suffer most from the loss of savings deposits during periods of rising 
interest rates, They are reluctant to raise their interest rates on 
share accounts to competitive positions, There are several reasons for 
this, First, there exist informal ceilings on their interest rates 
imposed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board through the use of regula-
tory restrictions on advances, In order to be able to borrow from the 
Board, savings and loan associations must abide by its regulations, 
Second, the nature of the assets and liabilities of savings and loan 
associations makes them unwilling to change their interest rates easily. 
Time deposits are nominally liq1,1id, but savings and loan associations 
invest these funds in mortgages that have a duration which runs into 
decades, The interest rate payable on such mortgages is set at the 
beginning of the period at a frozen level, meaning it cannot be raised 
or lowered as market conditions change, This also means that the 
amount of revenue by savings and loans in a given period of time is 
relatively fixed, It makes it difficult for them to raise the yields 
on savings shares. Thus, when interest rates are rising, the marginal 
cost of attracting new savings by raising interest rates far exceeds 
marginal revenue, If interest rates are raised, not only new deposits, 
but all deposits must be paid at the new higher rate. The result of 
the associations 1 reluctance to raise interest rates on share accounts 
is that savings funds are diverted away from them. Their mortgage 
lending act·ivity would, thus, have to be reduced. 
Other lenders of mortgage loans, especially those with diversified 
lending authority, would shift away from these loans during such per-
iods as well, Commercial banks, for example, will prefer business and 
consumer loans to mortgage loans. 19 The reason is because the former 
two types are considered to be more profitable, have shorter maturity 
dates, and are associated with long-standing depositor relationships. 
Home building and buying, on the other hand, are deemed marginal 
risks. 20 
23 
The result of a rise in cost and a reduction in availability of 
borrowing is that less homes will be constructed. This situation is 
shown in Figure 4, which is developed from the analysis in Chapter IL 
Th,e assumptions are the same as before. Now, consider first a 
Price 
11 Quantity per 
!1 Unit of Time '--~----~-------~~----~~ 
Q2QlQ2 Ql 
Figure 4 - A Reduction in Housing Construction. 
19G. L. Bach, 11 How Discriminatory is Tight Money?"· Banking and 
ti'lonetary Studies,, ed. Dean Carson {Homewood, 1963), pp. 254-290. -
2°'Department of the Treasury, 11 Ho~si ng and Mortgage Markets in 
l 966, 11 A S~ud~ of Mortgage Credit, United States Senate Committee on 
Bankilng an· Currency; Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Nineti-
eth Congress, First Session {Wa,shington, 1967), p. lZl. 
11 ··-
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reduction in demand as a result of a rise in interest rate and a reduc-
tion of loans available for borrowing. This would shift Din the first 
period to the left to 01 in the second period, At the same time total 
supply will also shift from s1 in the first period to Si in the second, 
because the volume of housing construction also contracts for the 
same reason causing the shift in demand. The volume of residential 
construction thus reduces from Q1-Q1 in the first period, to Q2-Q2 in 
the second period. 
CHAPTER IV 
MONETARY AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS IN 1965-1968 
Introduction 
This chapter traces the developments of monetary policy and their 
impact on the performance of the housing sector from 1965 to 19680 A 
comparison of the situation. and outcome in 1966 with those in 1968 is 
madeo These two periods had many things in col111Tlon. Yet, no crisis 
.occurred in the ~ousing sector in 1968 as it did in 1966. 
Developments in 1965 
The United States economy in 1965 was one of expansion, Total 
real output of the economy rose by 5.5 per cent, 21 The unemployment 
rate dropped to 4.1 per cent at the end of the year. Total personal 
income increased by 6.7 per cent and personal savings by 4.8 per cent 
21unless otherwise indicated, the following sources of information 
have been used in this part~ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 
Annual Report for 1965-1968; Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Annual 
Report for 19_65-1968; Federa1 Home Loan Bank Board.., Annual ~10rt for 




from the levels of 1964,. As the economy moved closer to full capacity, 
upward price pressures increased. 
Against this background, monetary policy shifted over the year 
from mild ease to mild restraint. Interest rates began to climb as a 
result: rates on corporate securities early in 1965, rates on long-
term Government bonds after midyear, and three-month Treasury bill 
rates in October. The rate on home mortgages, however, remained at 
about the same level as in 1964. The trend is illustrated in Figure 5. 
Bank reserves, however, were large, averaging an increase of 5 per cent 
over 1964. Savings flows into major institutions all showed a gain 
also; 15 per cent for commercial banks, 8 per cent for savings and 
loan associations, and 7 per cent for mutual savings banks. The money 
supply increased from 159.4 billion dollars in 1964 to 167.2 billion 
dollars in 1965, or an increase of about 5 per cent. 
Private nonfarm construction was one sector which failed to show 
any significant advance in 1965. Housing starts decreased by 3 per 
cent from the 1964 level. This fall in housing construction, however, 
could not be attributed to changes in cost and availabi'1ity of borrow-
ing, As mentioned above, loanable funds were readily available in 1965. 
Interest rates on conventional mortgage loans remained fairly stable 
around 5.80 per cent since 1964 (see Figure 5, page 27). The residen-
tial construction cost index for 1965 was 115.2 compared with 111.6 for 
1964, which means that average construction cost was rising only mod-
erately in 1965 ... These monetary conditions could not have hindered 
housing activity. 
An explanation for the reduction in housing starts is found on the 
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Figure 5 - Long and Short-term Interest Rates,, 
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previous four years preceding 1965 .. This surplus situation can be seen 
from the fact that the housing vacancy rate had been rising since the 
early 1960 1s. It rose from 6,9 per cent in 1961 to 7.5 per cent in 
1965. This implied that the supply of housing was rising faster than 
the demand for it. 
Developments in 1966 
The economy.continued its expansion in 1966. Total real output of 
goods and services increased by 5.6 per cent over 1965. The economy 
approached full uti l i za ti on of resources. The unemployment rate dropped 
below-~ per cent of the labor force. Personal income and savings 
. ::k 
climt>~.c;i to new heights, reaching 598.3 and 30.4 billion dollars at 
annual rates respectively in the final quarter of the year. Consumer 
prices went up, too, averaging a rise of 4 per cent within a single 
year. bemand for output and credit continued to increase throughout 
1966 and, before long, became excessive. 
Beginning in December, 1965, the Federal Reserve Board undertook a 
series of actions trying to dampen the growth of credit. It raised 
the discount rate from 4 to 4.5 per cent. In mid-1966, reserve require-
ments for time deposits at commercial banks were raised; and 'in Septem-
ber, the Board resorted to moral suasion, asking the banks to reduce 
lending activity. All of these monetary actions created extreme 
tightness in the credit market. The money supply fell from lt] .1 
bil 1 ion dollars in June to 1159. 2 bi 11 ion do 11 ars in December. Its 
annual growth rate in 1966 was but 2.2 per cent. Tightness in the 
market also caused interest rates to go up (see Figure 5, pa~e 27). In 
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order that commercial banks could compete for savings and time deposits, 
the Federal Reserve raised Regulation Q's ceiling rate on savings cer-
tificates to 5.5 per cent in December, 1965. 
Savings flows into thrift institutions declined sharply. Not only 
had they to compete with direct market investments for savings funds, 
they also had to meet the challenge from commercial banks as a result of 
a change in Regulation Q. The result was that mortgage-oriented insti-
tutions suffered severely. "This was the first time in the post-World 
War II period that a marked drop in funds available to thrift institu-
tions had occurred.1122 The extent of the decline in depository funds by 
major institutions is shown in Figure 6. As a consequence of this 
reduction in savings funds, lending activity by nonbanks, particularly 
savings and loan associations was greatly reduced. Private housing 
starts fell from an annual rate of about 1.5 million units early in 
1966 to a rate below one million units in the final quarter of the year. 
This was the lowest rate of housing starts in twenty years. 23 Monthly 
rates of private housing starts are shown in Table II, page 31, 
Changes in the other determinants of short-run housing construction 
were favorable to increasing activity. The vacancy rate dropped from 
7.5 per cent in 1965 to 7.1 per cent in 1966, and the total number of 
unsold homes declined to below ~00,000 units for the first time since 
1961. These conditions, ceteris paribus, encouraged the building of 
more houses. 
22Federa l Home Loan Bank Board~ Annual : Report (Washington, 1966) p. l. 
23savings and Loan .Fact Book (Chicago, 1967), p. 18. -~---~~ 
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Figure 6 - Net Inflow of Savings into Major Institutions, 1965-




MONTHLY RATES OF PRIVATE HOUSING STARTS IN THOUSANDS Of UNITS 
. Month 1965 1966 1967 . 1968 
Jan 1384 1403 1019 1430 
Feb 1418 1381 H32 1499 
Mar 1429 1400 H}67 1479 
Atprr 1432 1356 Hl99 1562 
May 1461 1232 1254 1345 
June 1476 1161 1214 1348 
Jul 1484 l 061 1356 1507 
Aug 1382 1088 1381 1496 
Sep 1453 1020 1415 1570 
O.ct 1438 824 1478 1541 
Nov 1443 956 1567 1689 
Dec 1544 910 1235 1439 
Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
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Developments in 1967 
The econolTJY expanded at~ reduced rate in 1967. Total real output 
rose about 2.5 per cent. Despite this slowdown, the economy continued 
to use its resources at high levels." The unemployment rate remained 
under 4 per cent. Personal income went up 6.5 per cent~ compared with 
8.5 per cent in 1966, and the rate of saving (the ratio of personal 
saving to disposal income) jumped to 7.3 per cent in the first quarter 
of the year, the highest in a decade. 24 
Against these economic conditions, the Federal Reserve shifted to 
a policy of ease in late 1966 and during most of 1967. It increased 
total bank reserves by more than 6 per cent over the level in 1966, 
compared with only a 4 pe~ cent rise in 1965. In March~ res~rv.e 
requirements against savings deposits at member banks were lowered. In. 
April, it lowered the discount rate from 4.5 per cent to 4 per cent. 
The initial impact of the shift to monetary ease was a drop in 
interest rates on securities. However, when demand for funds by var-
ious sectors soared again after midyear, interest rates began to move 
up again (see Figure 5, page 27). The Federal Reserve continued its 
policy of ease, however, until in November, when it raised the dis-
count rate back to 4.5 per cent in response to devaluation of the pound 
by Britain. 25 
24Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Perspective 1967 (New York, 
1968), p. 4. 
25 Ibid. 
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Savings flows into financial intermediaries recovered sharply in 
1967 when yields on market investments declined in response to a less 
restrictive monetary policy. As a result, more credit was available 
for the mortgage market. Housing starts rose steadily in 1967, after 
an ·initial lag . "The lag reflects the time required by lenders, build-
ers, and buyers to begi n to readjust plans in line with a shift in 
financial resources . This lag was intensified in 1967 by the near-
collapse of the housing market in 1966. 1126 A complete revival was 
achieved in September and October when housing starts reached a level 
of 1.4 million units (see Table I I, page 34) . 
During the second half of 1967, market interest rates went up (see 
Figure 5, page 27), but savings institutions were not adversely affect~ 
ed. The Fede·ral Reserve contin1.4~d to supply reserves liberally, 
i ncreas htg total member bank reserves from 22,534 million do 11 ars in 
June, to 23,830 million dollars toward the end of the year, or an 
increase of over 11 per cent, at. an .annual rate. The money supply was 
also boosted by a little over 5 per cent during the year. Savings 
flows into savings and loan associations showed a gain ~f 167 per cent 
over 1966, and 13 per cent over 1965. A rise in this major source of 
assGciation funds meant that loans were more readily available to the 
housing sector in 1967 than pr~viously. Housing starts continued to 
improve in the final quarter .of 19.67 (see Table II, page 31). 
26soard ·df Governors, "Housing:. anct the Residentia 1 Mortgage Market 
in 1967 ," ·Federal Reserve Bulletin, LIII (September, 1967), pp. 1471-72. 
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Besides changes in cost and availability of borrowing, conditions 
in housing supply in 1967 were favorable to increasing construction: 
the vacancy rate declined further from 7.1 in 1966 to 6.2 per cent in 
1967, and the number of unsold homes dropped to 185,000 units, the 
lowest since 1961. 
Developments in 1968 
The economy continued to expand in 1968, but inflationary pres-
sures ~athered momentum. Total real output ciimbed 5 per cent over the 
previous year. Consumer prices continued to rise, averaging an increase 
of about 4 per cent in the year. Resources were used at a near-capacity , 
level. Unemployment dropped to the lowest rate in 15 years. Personal 
income bounded up by over 9 per,cent in 1968, but personal savings 
decreased slightly from the 1967 level. 
Mounting inflationary pressures that had begun in late 1967 made 
the Federal Reserve turn to more restrictive measures. Open market 
operations were used to put pressure on the reserve positions of member 
banks. Consequently, member banks had to step up their borrowing at 
the Federal Reserve: from a total volume of 238 million dollars in 1967 
to 765 million dollars in 1968, a rise of over three times the 1967 
amount. Reserve requirements against demand deposits in excess of 5 
million dollars were raised. The B6ard also boosted the discount rate 
twice, from 4.5 to 5, and then to 5.5 per cent. The growth rate of the 
money supply slowed down during the year from a rate of 5 per cent dur-
ing the first half of 1968, to only 2.5 per cent toward the end of the 
year. As a result, interest rates rose, and exceeding the 1966 peaks 
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(see Figure 5, page 27). In May, most interest rates receded. The 
Federal Reserve loosened its policy, lowering the discount rate to 5.25 
per cent. However, toward the final quarter of the year, it was 
evident that the economy was still advancing too rapidly. High credit 
demands pushed interest rates up to new heights. The Federal Reserve 
again increased the discount rate to 5.5 per cent. 
In 1968, the Federal Reserve was careful in the use of Regulation. 
Q for fear of repeating the grave consequences which occurred in 1966. 
The ceiling rates were raised on a graduated basis this time, from 5.5 
per cent on deposits of the shortest maturities to 6.25 per cent on 
deposits of maturities of 180 days or more. 
Housing continued its remarkable performance despite tight credit 
conditions during much of 1968. Starts for the year stood at 1.5 
million unitsj an increase of 16. per cent over 1967. 
Two main reasons accounted for this advance in housing construc-
tion in 1968. First, funds were available to the housing sector; 
Savings flows into thrift institutions diminished in 1968, as in pre-
vious peri ads of tight credit. For example, savings and loan assoc-
iations experienced a reduction of 30 per cent in savings inflow in 
1968. But these institutions struggled to maintain their sources of 
funds, the detail of which is discussed later .in this chapter. Some 
intermediaries also helped the housing sector by committing more funds 
to mortgage lending. Mutual savings banks were among these inter-
mediaries; they increased their mortgage loan commitment by 21 per 
cent .in 1968, compared with a drop of 25 per cent in 1966. The overall 
effect was that housing activity was stimulated because of the 
availability of loan fu~dls. 27 S~cond, the vacancy rate fell to 5.4 
per cent in 1968, the lowest rate in the 1960°s. It, tnen, served as 
an impetus to increasing housing construction in 1968. 
Situations in 1966 and 1968 Compared 
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It can be seen from the previous section that the situations in 
1966 and 1968 were similar in many respects. In both instances, infla-
tionary pressures threatened a rapidly-growing economy, with consumer 
prices rising by 3.3 per cent in 1966 and 4.2 per cent in 1968. A 
restrictive monetary policy as reflected by rising interest rates and a 
slower growth rate of the money supply was in effect during most of the 
two years. Interest rates were much higher in 1968 than in 1966 (see 
Figure 5, page 27), and the money supply grew much faster in 1968,than 
in 1966, the former year having an annual growth rate of 6.5 per cent 
while the latter averaged only 2.2 per cent. 
Real income rose in both 1966 and 1968, The amount of increase 
was greater in the former year: 4.9 per cent in 1966, compared with 2.8 
per cent in 1968. 
So far as the cost of borrowing is concerned, the interest rate 
on conventional home mortgage loans averaged 6.75 per cent in 1968, 
compared with an average of 5.5 per cent in 1966. Despite the lower 
interest rates in 1966, loans were more difficult to obtain in that 
27soard of Governors, "Financial Developments in the Fourth Quar-
ter of 1968, 11 Federal Reserve Bulletin, LV (February, 1969), pp. 92-96. 
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year than in 1968. As discussed previously, the reason was that savings 
and loan associations , the largest suppliers of mortgage loans, exper-
ienced a sharp reduction in their sources of funds in 1966 when higher 
interest rates on direct investments and on savings and time deposits 
at commercial banks attracted loanable funds away from those associa-
tions. As a resu1t of a reduction in available l oans, many people 
were forced to postpone their housi ng demand in 1966. 
On the supply side of housing, more houses should have been con-
structed in 1966 than in 1968, if construction cost was a significant 
determinant of construction and other things remained the same in both 
years . Average construction cost rose 7.6 per cent in 1968, whi l e it 
was 4.6 per cent in 1966. However, other things did not remain the 
same in both years. The supply of housing was less adequate in 1968 
than in 1966. This is reflected in the f act that the housing vacancy 
rate was 5.4 per cent in 1968, and 7.1 per cent i n 1966; the number of 
unsold homes declined sl ightly from 195,000 units in 1966 to 186,000 
units i n early 1968. These conditions might have encouraged a stepup 
in housing acti vi ty in 1968. A further different phenomenon existed i n 
the two years which affected housing supply. Construction funds were 
more readily available in 1968 than in 1966. Just as the avai labi l ity 
of borrowing could cause a postponement of housing demand , i t could 
also exert the same effect on supply . Home-builders had great diffi -
cu l ties in obtaining loan funds in 1966 , and this shortage s l owed 
housing activity in that year. 
From the above comparisons , it is clear that availabi l ity of loans 
to the housing sector is a major determinant of the volume of construc-
tion . It was this factor which di stinguished the performance of the 
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housing sector in 1968 from that in 1966, Thrift institutions were 
unable to supply loans in 1966 due to a curtailment of savings inflows. 
The reasons for this curtailment have been discussed in Chapter III. 
In 1966, the reduction of savings inflows into nonbanks was intensified 
by the successive actions of the Federal Reserve raising Regulation Q's 
ceiling rates on savings and time deposits at commercial banks. Sig .. 
nificant outflows of savings from thrift institutions, particularly 
savings and loan associations, were noticed in late 1965 when the 
cei 1 i ng rates on certi fi ca tes of deposits at commercial banks were 
fi.rst raised. However, it must be mentioned that the greatest competi-
' 
tion for savings funds came from the se<;:urity markets. In 1966, indi-
vidual savings in the form of government, corporate, and other securi-
ti es rose by 14. 9 bi 11 ion do 11 ars -- three times the 1965 increase. On 
the other hand, growth in commercial bank time deposits was less than 
half the 1965 increase on a percentage basis. 28 
t 
In 1968, the competitive position of commercial banks for savings. 
was less advantageous than in 1966. After the experience of 1966, the 
Federal Reserve was careful in the use of Regulation Q. Instead of·a 
flat raise. in the ceiiing rates as in 1966, tt chose a graduated 
increase, with the lowest rate on deposits of the shortest maturity. 
The purpose was to narrow interest rate differentials between savings 
shares at associations and short-term savings deposits at commercial 
28The American Bankers Association, Statement to the United 
States Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Subcommittee on 
Housing and Urban Affairs, A Study of Mortgage Credit, Ninetieth 
Congress, First Session (Washington, 1967), pp. 143-150. ·. 
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banks so that the incentive to shift funds from the former.to the 
latter was minimized. Differentials in interest rates have been care-
fully studied by authorities concerned since 1966. The Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board, the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposits Insurance 
Corporation were given power, after 1966, to review, periodically, and 
after consultation with each other, to establish maximum interest rates 
on the important 'consumer type• depository claims. The purpose was to 
reduce fluctuations in the flow of funds.into residential mortgage 
lenders, particularly savings and loan associations (arising from 
interest rate competitions). 29 As a result of -this arrangement, 
commercial banks have no great advantages over thrift institutions in 
the competition for savings deposits. 
In 1968, efforts of the ~ssociations to promote special high-rate 
and long~maturity accounts resulted in an increase in savings inflows. 
These special accounts existed in 1966, but very little was done to 
promote their popularity. They constituted only 8 per cent of all 
savings deposits at associations in 1966. By the end of 1968, such 
accounts had grown to constitute almost 24 per cent.30 The bulk of the 
increase in savings at associations in 1968 was in such accountsi The 
result of a rise in the holding of these long-term deposits .was that 
the danger of the sudden outflow of savings funds from associations 
29Board of Governors, 11 Construction and the Mortgage Market ,U 
Federal Reserve Bwlletin,LIV (October, 1968), p. 788i 
30Richard Pickering, 11 Savings and Loan Industry -- A Review for 
1968,81 Journal of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, II (March, 1969),p,8. 
would be reduced. 
A reduction in cash inflows experienced by associations in 1966 
also contributed to the decline in their source of operating funds. 
Prepayment on outstanding mortgage loans fell off .sharply as the 
reduced volume of new lending slowed turnover in older properties and 
as more buyers assumed outstanding loans in order t6 finance real 
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estate transactions. In 1966, savings and loan associations.experienced 
a decline in cash flows from loan retirements of nearly 5.8 billions 
dollars. 31 In 1968, cash flows from loan retirements did not decline. 
Associations also maintained the,ir sources of funds by portfolio adjust-
ments, increasing advances from the Federal Home Loan Banks~ drawing 
down cash and deposit balances and retaining a larger amount of earnings 
for investment. The ability of associations to retain higher earnings 
was made possible by the rise in earning assets and increased rate of. 
return on these assets i ff ] 968. 32 The extent to which savings and loan 
associations were able to maintain their liquidity in 1968 is indicated 
in Table III and in Figure 6. As can be seen from this table, net 
savings receipts declined significantly in the second quarter of 1966, 
and there was a net outflow of savings in the third quarter. But at no 
time in.1968 were savings receipts less than those in 1966, and there 
was never any net outflow of savings in 1968. Loan repayments were 
also large and steady in all the four quarters of 1968, whereas they 
31 Board of Governors, "Monetary Policy and the Residential Mortgage 
Market,i1 Federal Reserve Bulletin, LIU (May, 1967), p. 732. 
32Richard.Pickering, p. 8. 
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TABLE Ill 
MAJOR SOURCE OF ASSOCIATION FUNDS, IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS 
Net Savings Advances Mortgages 
Re.ce.ipts from FHLBB Repaid Total .. 
1965 1st Q 1908 .. 577 3284 4615 
2nd II 2368 838 3813 7019 
3rd II 1199 214 4046 5459 
4th II 3038 ]94 3835 7067 
1966 1st II 1321 .. 301 3427 4447 
2nd II 797 1093 3537 5427 
3rd II .. 745 394 2314 1963 
4th II 2283 ... 241 2661 4703 
1967 1st II 1528 .. 1757 2735 2506 
2nd II 3546 .. 874 3092 5764 
3rd II 1930 .. 178 3474 5226 
4th II 2683 263 3146 6092 
1968 1st II 1608 .. 123 3187 4672 
2nd II 2114 614 3526 6254 
3rd II 934 145 3589 4668 
4th II 2786 230 3495 6511 
Source: Federal Home Loan Bank Board., 
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showed a large reduction in the third and fourth quarters of 1966. 
Differences in other, sources of funds in these two years are indicated 
in Figure 7. The most significant were in retained earnings and in 
miscellaneous sources besides savings receipts. 
The i nfl exi bi l i ty' of usury laws in many states in 1966 al so dis-
couraged mortgage lending by thrift institutions. These laws limited 
interest rates on loans to individuals to 6 per cent; With higher 
interest rates available on alternative investments, there was little 
incentive to commit funds to mortgages subject to usury law limits. 
In 1968, some states, for example, New York, New Jersey, and Maryland, 
became more flexible with their usury laws, raising their ceiling 
limits when situations warranted. This proved benefici~l to the hous-
ing market. Following the relaxation of the usury ceiling limits on 
home mortgage rates in several states in 1968, commercial banks and 
mutual savings banks expanded their mortgage lending, for they found it 
profitable to do so under the new laws. In 1968, commercial banks 
increased their mortgage lending by over 10 per cent, and mutual sav-
ings by 21 per cent. Undoubtedly, a portion of this increase can be 
attributed to the relaxation of usury laws, 
Therefore, the difference in performance in the housing sector in 
the two years was the result of efforts taken by parties concerned. In 
1968, the Federal Reserve took care that its Regulation Q would cause 
no adverse effects on the savings flows of mortgage-oriented institu-
tions. On the other hand, these institutions, particularly savings and 
loan associations, took steps to insure their sources of funds. Also, 
the technical features of the housing market, such as vacancy rates and 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose -.of this· thesi.s .. has been, -to--explore -the background · 
behind the differential performances of the housing sector in two simi-
lar economic and monetary situations in 1966 and 1968. 
Monetary policy is said to exert a special effect on the volume of 
residential construction. Experiences in the past have shown this to 
be true. 
Monetary policy is able to affect housing through its influences on 
two of the determinants of residential con~truction. These determinants 
-- cost and availability of borrowing -- are rather important because of 
the way housing is usually financed. Both home-buyers and home-builders 
depend heavily on long-term borrowing to finance their activity. There-
fore~ any time these variables change, housing construction will also be 
affected. 
Housing loans have traditionally been supplied by thrift institu-
tions such as savings and loan associations~ mutual savings banks, life 
insYrance companies~ a11d commercial banks. Of these institutions, 
savings and loan assoc:i at ions are, by far, the 1 argest suppliers of these 
loans. 
The cost and availability of loans can be altered by monetary 
actions. When the monetary authorities tighten credit and the money 
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supply, the cost-of loans goes.up and their availability down. During 
such periods, the demand for loanable funds increases relative to 
supply and thereby driving up all interest rates, and the savings flow 
into mortgage-oriented institutions declines during such times~ These 
institutions usually cannot compete with direct market investments for 
savings funds because of their limited ability to raise interest rates. 
The existence of usury ·laws, the long .. term nature of the majority of 
their investments, and the consideration of marginal cost and marginal 
revenue in raising interest rates are some of the causes for their 
reluctance to increase yields on savings shares. 
A reduction in savings flow into associations will be more serious 
if Regulation Q raises significantly the ceiling rates on savings and 
time deposits at commercial banks above those on savings shares at 
associations and other nonbanks. Interest-sensitive savers are likely 
to shift their funds from shares to deposits. 
With a rise in interest cost and a reduction in available loan 
funds, many home-buyers and builders may have to postpone their 
activity. 
The period 1966-1968 provides evidence for the above theory. Mone-
tary restriction was effective in the two years of 1966 and 1968. Resi-
dential construction decreased drastically in 1966 as a result of high 
interest rates and a severe reduction in available loans due to an 
e~ormous decline in savings flows.into thrift institutions, the latter 
resulting from the operation of Regulation Q. In 1968, both interest 
rates and savings flows into thrift institutions behaved in the same 
manrner as in any previous periods of monetary restraint. However, the 
extent of the curtailment in savings flows was smaller this time as a 
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result of the care taken by the monetary authorities in the use of 
Regulation Q. The ceiling rates on deposits at commercial banks were 
raised i !Tl such a way thait there was 1 ittle incentive for s·hort-term 
savers to shift their funds from savings shares to bank deposits. The 
reduction in savings flows was also made less severe by efforts of 
associations to attract new savings through the promotion of special 
accounts. Associatfons also struggled to maintain their sources of 
funds by increasing retained earnings which were realized in 1968. A 
larger repayment of loans in 1968 than in 1966 also helped to increase 
the liquidity of the associations. Relaxation of usury laws in many 
states also encouraged the flow of funds into mortgage markets, and 
tended to lead a few institutions to expand their mortgage lending. 
With adequate funds available to the housing sector, the volume of con-
struction could be expanded. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the experiences of the period 
1966-68: 
1. Cost and availability of borrowing determine the volume of 
residentfal construction to a great extent in the short run. 
2. Conditions in the supply of housing as reflected by the hous-
ing vacancy rate and the number of unsold homes seem important varia-
bles, at least during the period of this study. An inverse relation-
ship existed between the volume of residential construction and the 
vacancy rate and also between the former and the inventory of unsold 
homes. 
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